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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498 (2009).
Power plants that produce large amounts of heat in the course of
generating electricity often utilize "cooling water intake structures" that
extract water for cooling purposes from adjacent water sources. However,
the operation of these structures also adversely affects the environment.
Specifically, the cooling water intake structures draw in aquatic organisms
- from tiny phytoplankton to large fish - that then become either impacted
("impinged") on the intake screens, or suctioned ("entrainment") in the
cooling water system.
The deleterious environmental impacts of these structures bring
them within the purview of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which
mandates that the design and operation of cooling water intake structures
"reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact." After nearly three decades of distinguishing what
constitutes the "best technology available" on a case-by-case basis, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") promulgated a set of
regulations that set forth a universal set of standards to determine whether
particular cooling water intake structures satisfy the requirements of the
CWA. "Phase I" of these regulations, which apply to new cooling water
intake structures, requires the installation of closed-cycle cooling systems,
which recirculate water and, consequently, extract less water from
adjacent waterways than conventional cooling systems. "Phase II" of
these regulations, which apply to existing facilities, requires power plants
to take measures to reduce aquatic organism mortality to EPA established
"national performance standards," but fails to mandate closed-cycle
cooling systems, or an equivalent reduction in impingement and
entrainment. EPA declined to mandate the same standards for Phase II as
for Phase I because of the costs associated with retrofitting existing
facilities with closed-cycle technology and because other cheaper
technologies closely approach the closed-cycle performance standards.
A group of petitioners, including several environmental groups and
various States, asserted that EPA's cost-benefit analysis is impermissible
under a plain language analysis of the CWA. The Second Circuit agreed
with petitioners and remanded the regulations to EPA for clarification on
whether EPA relied on a cost-benefit analysis in establishing national
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performance standards. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, upon
review, reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court found the CWA's "best technology" language
to be ambiguous - it could either refer to technology that reasonably
achieves the greatest mitigation of environmental degradation, or it could
also describe technology that most efficiently minimizes environmental
degradation. Furthermore, the phrase "for minimizing adverse
environmental impact" indicates degree and, therefore, does not
necessitate technology that achieves the greatest possible reduction in
environmental impact. According to the Court, since other CWA
provisions explicitly demonstrate that Congress has used plain language to
mandate, for example, the greatest feasible reduction in water pollution,
the language of the "minimizing adverse environmental impact" provision
implies that EPA has discretion on this issue.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that whether or not it is reasonable
to consider a particular cost depends on the resulting benefits. In this
same vein, EPA's cost-benefit analysis was deemed a reasonable exercise
of discretion with regards to the CWA because EPA's "national
performance standards" provided an efficient mechanism where the
approximate benefits of closed-cycle cooling systems could be achieved at




N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 561 F.3d
132 (3rd Cir. 2009).
In July 2005, AmerGen Energy Corporation applied to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter NRC) to renew its license
for operation of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey.
Under NRC regulations, interested parties may request a hearing to air any
safety or environmental concerns involving the relicensing. The New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter NJDEP) took
this opportunity to raise concerns about the NRC's failure to prepare an
environmental impact study on the effects of a possible future terrorist
attack on the power plant.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC may renew
licenses for nuclear power plants for up to 20 years. As part of the renewal
process, the NRC must conduct a health and safety review focused on the
effects of aging of the plant. Further, the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1970 requires the NRC to complete an environmental review
focusing on potential environmental effects of 20 years of further
operation. This review is meant solely to inform the NEA's decision
regarding renewal and therefore requires only that the agency consider
significant acts of environmental impact. It does not require agencies to set
any standards for environmental protection.
Nonetheless, the NRC does set its own standards of inquiry
regarding the NEPA requirements. First, the agency keeps track of issues
common to all nuclear power plants, including the risk of sabotage or
attack. The NRC has concluded that the risk of sabotage in general is very
small, and that, in the event that an attack occurs, the resultant damage
will be no more serious than that which would occur following some kind
of accident. Second, the NRC addresses certain plant-specific issues
during renewal proceedings. Among these inquiries is whether the
possibility of a severe accident has been adequately addressed by the
particular plant in question. Specifically, plants must have a plan to
mitigate damage resulting from such accidents.
So when the NJDEP brought its concerns before the licensing
board, the board denied its request to prepare a separate environmental
impact report regarding terrorist attacks, holding that considerations of
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terrorist attacks lie outside the scope of licensing renewal proceedings.
The NRC found that terrorist attacks do not relate to aging of facilities,
and that the NRC had already taken extensive action independent of
renewal proceedings to address security concerns in the aftermath of the
events of September 1 1 . Finally, the NRC found that because damage
resulting from a terrorist attack would likely be comparable to damage
caused by an accident at the facility, and because the licensing process
already took steps to ensure proper safeguards regarding accidents,
additional inquiries regarding the threat of terrorist attack would be
redundant. NJDEP petitioned the 3rd Circuit, which upheld the NRC's
order on two main grounds.
First, the court found that NJDEP had not shown a causal
relationship between the relicensing proceedings and the environmental
effects of a terrorist attack. According to the Supreme Court in
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, there must be
a relationship between the environmental effect and the federal action at
issue. The 4th Circuit here held that because there was no causal
relationship between the relicensing proceedings and the environmental
effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack, the NRC was not required to
prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment regarding those effects. The
NRC is not charged with regulating airspace above nuclear facilities, and
has articulated its view that the Federal Aviation Administration is better
equipped to judge the threat of terrorist attack and the best ways to prevent
such an attack. The court held that because the NRC has no authority to
regulate airborne attacks on nuclear facilities, an Environmental Impact
Assessment would be of limited use. Because the relicensing proceedings
are not a proximate cause of terrorist attacks and the environmental impact
thereof, the 3 rd Circuit held that the NRC was not required to address that
threat under NEPA.
Second, the court held that the NRC had already assessed the
environmental impact of a hypothetical terrorist attack, because the NRC
had already prepared an assessment of the environmental effect of a
hypothetical nuclear accident. NJDEP argued that the Oyster Creek
facility was unique in that it was located in a populated area in which a
terrorist attack was more likely and that the environmental impact of such
an attack would be greater than at most other plants. The court dismissed
these arguments on procedural grounds. The 3 rd Circuit held that because
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the NRC had already prepared generic assessments of the risk and
consequences of a nuclear accident, it had no responsibility to prepare
specific assessments for each renewal proceeding. Therefore, the NRC has
no responsibility to prepare environmental impact assessments on the
impact of possible terrorist attacks.
ROBERT A. NOCE
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Palmyra Pacific Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1361
(C.A.Fed. 2009).
The United States Court of Appeals decided Palmyra Pacific
Seafoods v. United States on April 9, 2009. This controversy involved
warning labels on tuna cans. Since mercury is found in tuna and is
harmful to a developing fetus, the California Attorney General argued that
consumers deserved to have a warning label on the cans of tuna because of
the health risks posed by the mercury content.
After a 24-day bench trial, the trial court found that the labels were
not required under Proposition 65, a California law that requires
companies to place warning labels on their products that contain
substances known to cause cancer. Specifically, the trial court held that
federal law preempts Proposition 65 because it would clash with the
FDA's current method of warning consumers about the risks of eating
tuna. Furthermore, the trial court found that the tuna companies
sufficiently showed that they would be exempt from Proposition 65
because the exposure to mercury by the average woman fell below the
required amount for a warning label. Finally, the trial court found that the
mercury naturally occurs in the tuna, making it exempt from the warning
requirements.
The State appealed the trial court's ruling. The appeals court
specifically focused on the third ruling, holding that the State did not
present enough evidence to overcome its burden of proof to overturn the
trial decision. Since the State challenged findings of fact, the court was
required to utilize the "substantial evidence rule", in which the evidence is
reviewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. The moving
party is required to show that there was not enough evidence to back up
the prevailing party's claim; if the moving party fails to meet this burden,
the court must defer to the trial court decision.
This appeals court held that there is sufficient evidence showing
that the mercury found in tuna is naturally occurring. The State attacked
two studies conducted by the tuna companies' expert witnesses. One of
the studies purported to prove that the mercury found in tuna was naturally
occurring by comparing data from 1971 and 1998 and showing that there
was no rise in mercury in the atmosphere during that time, thus disproving
the assertion that the increase in mercury in tuna is due to pollution from
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humans. However, the State's attacks on these studies did not rise to the
level necessary to overcome the deference required by the standard of
review to overturn the decision.
Furthermore, the State asserts that Dr. Morel, one of the State's
experts, later rescinded his views on the natural occurrence of mercury in
tuna because one of his students presented a poster at a conference that
contradicted some of his views. However, Dr. Morel assured the appeals
court that his views had not in fact changed but that he merely supervised
the student's study. The appeals court held that the poster did not
accurately reflect Dr. Morel's views and that his testimony asserting that
mercury in tuna is naturally occurring is still acceptable evidence.
Because the State failed to rebut the evidence relied on by the trial
court, the appeals court held that there was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's holding that tuna companies are not required to place
warning labels on cans of tuna.
ABBIE E. HESSE ROTHERMICH
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North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 593 F.Supp.2d. 812
(2009).
In North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, North Carolina,
on behalf of its citizens, sought injunctive relief against the Tennessee
Valley Authority (hereinafter "TVA") for causing a public nuisance in
North Carolina from coal-fired power plants operated by TVA. The plants
are located in Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee. The TVA and North
Carolina estimated the cost to reduce the emission in the power plants
would cost between three and five billion dollars.
North Carolina argued that the pollution caused by coal-fired
power plants threatens the "health of millions of people" and irreversibly
affects the natural environment of North Carolina, thus constituting a
public nuisance. The injuries sustained by North Carolina range from
increased health costs associated with infant mortality and respiratory,
destruction of native species, and damage to other environmental assets,
such as scenic lookouts, which are affected by pollution caused haze.
North Carolina has also stated that the direct and indirect costs of the
pollution cost billions of dollars every year to North Carolina.
The TVA is a government mandated power producer that serves
many customers in the American Southeast. The TVA argues that
although some pollution originating from its power plants enters the state
of North Carolina, the pollution does not rise to the high level required to
be considered a public nuisance. The TVA also argued that the
environmental effects being experienced in North Carolina are due to
North Carolina's own power plants and not power plants located outside
the state. The TVA also argues that their ability to supply inexpensive
energy that is not overburdened by unneeded regulation is in the interest of
millions of citizens of the United States. The TVA finally argued that they
have taken mitigating measures to ensure that emission from their coal-
fired power plants did not enter North Carolina in "unreasonable
amounts."
The District Court first addressed whether the judiciary was the
appropriate forum for North Carolina to enforce their rights. The Court
stated that the traditional forum for enforcing "interstate air pollution
concerns" is a complaint lodged with the Environmental Protection
Agency. The court held that although this forum is better suited to hearing
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these claims, it is still within the right of the judiciary to enforce a state's
rights under the doctrine of public nuisance, through an equitable
judgment. The court also stated that North Carolina wished to enforce the
rights in a stricter way, when compared to the EPA's requirements for air
quality.
North Carolina sued to stop pollution from all of the TVA plants,
but the court limited their consideration to only include the four plants
within one hundred miles of North Carolina. The court held that the other
plants operated by TVA were too remote and that those four plants could
have the potential to contribute a significant amount of pollution into the
state of North Carolina.
The Court also decided which state nuisance law controls litigation
when pollution crosses interstate lines and creates a public nuisance in
another state. The Court held that they should apply the state law of the
state where the nuisance originates when there is an interstate public
nuisance. Applying this principle to the current case, the District Court
decided that even though the District Court was in North Carolina, and the
harm was in North Carolina, the controlling law is the state's law where
the coal-fired power plants are located. Thus, the court applied Alabama
nuisance law to the plants in Alabama, Tennessee nuisance law to the
Tennessee plants, and Kentucky nuisance law to the Kentucky plant.
In applying the individual state laws to the different plants, the
District Court found that one plant in Alabama and two plants in
Tennessee caused a public nuisance in North Carolina. The District Court
held that injunctive relief was appropriate because of the harm caused to
the citizens of North Carolina and that there existed a causal link between
the plant's pollution and the harm caused. The Court stated that Kentucky
law requires a nuisance to affect the public in an unreasonable amount. In
applying Kentucky nuisance law to the TVA Kentucky plants, the court
held that the Kentucky plants were too remote to satisfy Kentucky
nuisance law.
The District Court also held that requiring the addition of facilities
to reduce the pollution was an appropriate injunction to prevent the
nuisance from continuing. The District Court required that the three power
plants install scrubbers and selective catalytic reduction (SCR) which
removes mercury, sulfate, and nitrate from the emissions that originate in
a power plant's smokestacks. The District Court put a time line on the
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installation of the scrubbers and SCRs. The District Court gave the TVA
21 months to install SCRs and 27 months to install scrubbers on each
plant, rejecting the TVA's argument that it takes over five years to install a




Westinghouse Electric Co. v. U.S. 2009 WL 881605 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
Westinghouse Electric Company (hereinafter "plaintiff') owns
property that was previously owned or used by the defendants to process
nuclear fuel. Plaintiff cleaned up the pollution incurring costs which
plaintiff sought to recover under § 107(a) and § 113(f) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (hereinafter "CERCLA") from the United States
and four non-governmental defendants.
CERCLA facilitates the cleanup of polluted sites by granting the
President broad power to force cleanup and requires parties responsible to
contribute to the costs. A person may pursue costs from past and present
owners of a site under § 107(a) of CERCLA. Further, § 113(f) allows any
person to seek contribution from any other person or entity liable or
potentially liable under § 107(a).
The non-governmental defendants moved for summary judgment
arguing that the plaintiff cannot bring a suit under § 113(f) because no
administrative or judicially approved settlement resolving CERCLA
liability existed and plaintiff was not a party to a pending or resolved §
107 suit. On January 29, 2008, this Court under Judge Limbaugh, granted
the non-governmental defendants summary judgment on the § 113(f)
claim, leaving only the § 107(a) cost recovery claim. Judge Limbaugh
concluded that Missouri has no CERCLA authority without express EPA
delegation meaning that a § 104 cooperative agreement with EPA was
needed to trigger contribution under § 113(f).
Plaintiff asked this Court under Judge Perry to amend the order
and deny summary judgment. On appeal, the United States admitted that
Missouri has CERCLA authority without express EPA delegation but that
plaintiff cannot meet the standard for a motion for reconsideration. The
Court explained that district courts have considerable discretion in
deciding whether to reconsider a summary judgment motion which may be
granted because of a significant or controlling change in the law or if
justice requires.
Although the Court rejected plaintiffs argument that a change in
the law occurred that was not considered by Judge Limbaugh, the Court
reconsidered the issue nonetheless because justice required. The Court
reasoned that if plaintiff was precluded from recovery under § 113(f),
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plaintiff might be precluded from recovering any of its costs paid to the
State of Missouri.
The Court admitted that a split of opinion exists regarding whether
a state settlement in the absence of express EPA delegation could be
considered a judicially approved CERCLA settlement that triggered a §
113(f) contribution claim. The Court noted that recently the Western
District of New York, the District of Arizona and the Northern District of
New York have all held that a § 104 cooperative agreement is needed to
trigger a § 113(f) claim. However, the 9 th and the 2nd Circuit held that a §
104 claim is not needed.
The Court heavily relied on Congress' intent for CERCLA
explaining that Congress enacted CERCLA to address the serious
environmental and health risks caused by industrial pollution and was
intended to encourage voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
CERCLA's sections for cost recovery were intended to allow states to use
the state's resources for cleanup and recovery costs. Therefore, the Court
concluded, that disallowing plaintiff to recover its costs for pollution
cleanup from previous owners that used the site for nuclear fuel
processing would be contrary to the intentions of CERLCA.
This Court enacted a new rule holding that states have authority
under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) to recover costs regardless of whether a § 104
cooperative agreement with the EPA has been entered. The Court further
ruled that where a state is acting on its own and not in collaboration with
the federal government, EPA authorization is not required.
The Court noted, however, that it was not deciding whether the
consent decree was sufficient to trigger cost recovery under § 107(a) or
contribution under § 113(f). The Court reversed the grant of summary
judgment as to the recovery of costs under § 113(f) against the non-
governmental defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings
solely on the finding that Missouri has authority under § 107(a) and 113(f)
to recover costs regardless of whether a § 104 cooperative agreement with




Albert v. Peavey Co., 2009 WL 321934 (E.D. La. 2009).
Albert v. Peavey Co. involved a class action nuisance lawsuit
against a grain elevator. The grain elevator was allegedly operating in
such a manner as to permit dust particles to escape and land on the
plaintiffs property, constituting a nuisance. In order to resolve the
dispute, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana interpreted and applied Louisiana's Right to Farm Law, La.
Rev. Stat. § 3:3603 et seq.
In its Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the defendant indicated that, in general, Right to
Farm Acts are enacted by state legislatures to protect preexisting
agricultural operations from nuisance lawsuits where the agricultural
operation is operating in conformance with generally accepted agricultural
practices. Louisiana's Right to Farm Law is no exception as it contains
provisions granting agricultural operations immunity from nuisance
lawsuits so long as the operation was acting in accordance with generally
accepted agricultural practices and in existence prior to the date at which
the complaining party obtained an interest in its land. Additionally, the
defendant's memorandum indicated that all 50 states have some version of
a Right to Farm Act.
In applying Louisiana's Right to Farm Law, the court identified
four issues relevant to the disposition of the lawsuit: First, who bears the
burden of establishing the "generally accepted agricultural practices" and
what evidence is required to show a breach of that standard; Second, to
what extent, if at all, are Louisiana environmental laws and regulations
relevant to the determination of generally accepted agricultural practices;
Third, to what extent may lay testimony establish generally accepted
agricultural practices or a breach of generally accepted practices; and
finally, if a defendant acts contrary to generally accepted agricultural
practices by failing to keep records that might be evidence of generally
accepted practices, may that defendant then complain that the plaintiff has
failed to establish generally accepted agricultural practices.
The district court first found that a Louisiana court would likely
find that the defendant had the burden of establishing a breach of generally
accepted agricultural practices because of the statutory presumption that
all agricultural operations were acting in conformance with generally
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accepted standards. The court also noted that the standard was to be
determined by examining local practices.
Furthermore, the court determined that the defendant's violation of
Louisiana's environmental laws, standing alone and in the absence of any
other evidence of generally accepted agricultural practices, did not
establish that the defendant violated generally accepted agricultural
practices.
Next, the court determined that if lay testimony established
"obvious carelessness," then the lay testimony of the class members would
be sufficient to establish both generally accepted agricultural practices and
an existence of a breach of generally accepted agricultural practices.
However, if the alleged misconduct did not constitute "obvious
carelessness" then expert testimony would be required to establish the
generally accepted standard of conduct and a breach of that standard.
Finally, the court held that the defendant should not be punished
for failing to maintain emissions records because there were other means
available to the plaintiff to use in establishing generally accepted
agricultural practices. However, the court noted that if the emissions
records were the only evidence available, then the defendant might be
equitably estopped from asserting that the plaintiff had failed to establish a
breach of generally accepted agricultural practices.
After resolving the issues it identified as relevant, the court granted




Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 553
F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009)
On November 27, 2007, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") issued a Final Rule altering Clean Water Act
("CWA") and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") regulations regarding the use of pesticides near waters
protected under the CWA. Petitions for review of the Final Rule were
filed in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Federal circuits by two groups of petitioners. The
Environmental Petitioners represented environmental interest groups and
Industry Petitioners represented industry interest groups, both of whom
opposed the EPA's Final Rule. The petitions in these circuits and between
these petitioners were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit by order of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Environmental Petitioners filed
a motion for transfer to the Ninth Circuit, citing lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but the motion was denied.
In the consolidated action, the Environmental Petitioners argued
the EPA exceeded its authority under the CWA by issuing a rule that
excludes pesticides from the definition of "pollutant" under the CWA and
the EPA cannot exempt FIFRA-compliant applications of pesticides from
the requirements of the CWA. The Industry Petitioners argued the EPA's
Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious because it determined whether a
pesticide was a pollutant based on its compliance with FIFRA. The EPA
defended their Final Rule by arguing that the CWA is ambiguous as to the
definition of pesticides. The EPA also argued that even though they deem
pesticides generally not to be pollutants, but they determine pesticide
residue and excess pesticides to be pollutants under the CWA definition of
"pollutant" because "they are wastes of the pesticide application."
The Sixth Circuit first determined whether the EPA's Final Rule
complied with the Chevron doctrine. The court stated when conducting a
Chevron review, the court must examine the Final Rule against the statute
that contains the EPA's charge, and under such a review, the court should
determine the meaning of the words in the context they were written. If
the court determines the EPA's interpretation is reasonable, they must
defer to its construction of the statute. Therefore, the court considered the
EPA's rationales for its Final Rule in under the scope of the Chevron
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doctrine. The first issue the court examined was whether the CWA
unambiguously includes pesticides within its definition of "pollutant."
The court held while the list of substances defined as "pollutants" under
the CWA was not exhaustive, the plain language or "chemical waste" and
"biological materials" as used in the CWA are unambiguous as to
pesticides. The court further concluded that as long as a chemical
pesticide is intentionally applied to the water and leaves no excess, it is not
considered "chemical waste," and therefore, a pollutant under the CWA.
However, if excess chemical pesticides or pesticide residue finds its way
into waters protected under the CWA, the pesticide meets the CWA's
definition of "chemical waste." The court also held that "biological
materials" could not be read to exclude biological pesticides or their
residue and, therefore, the court held biological pesticides to be included
under the definition of "biological materials" under the CWA. Next, the
court determined whether chemical pesticide residuals were added to the
water by "point sources." The CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as
"any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
Because the EPA argues that at the time of discharge, the pesticide is a
nonpollutant, and the excess pesticide and pesticide residues are not
created until later, presumably after they are already in the water;
therefore, pesticides at the time of discharge do not require permits
because they are not yet excess pesticides or residue pesticides. The court
looks to the Supreme Court's previous examination of "point source"
under the CWA and holds that it was clear that but for the application of
the pesticide, the pesticide residue and excess pesticide would not be
added to the water; therefore, the pesticide residue and excess pesticide are
from a "point source." After examining the EPA's two rationales behind
their Final Rule, the Court determined the Final Rule could not stand
because the plain statutory language of the CWA invalidates the EPA's





American Farm Bureau Federation v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
The Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 -7671p (2000)
tasks the EPA with identifying air pollutants that "endanger public health
or welfare." After identifying the air pollutants the EPA must then develop
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") to protect the public
health, through primary NAAQS, and welfare, through secondary
NAAQS. In establishing these standards the EPA looks to the Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee ("CASAC") recommendations, among
other sources. CASAC is composed of seven individuals selected by the
Administrator to provide an "independent scientific review." Every five
years, if not sooner, the EPA must reevaluate the NAAQS and revise if
necessary.
Particulate matter ("PM") is comprised of two categories, fine
(PM 2 .5) and coarse (PM~o). The EPA generally utilizes the size of the PM
to determine which classification it falls into. The EPA promulgated
NAAQS for PM initially in 1971, but separate regulations for the two
kinds of PM were not passed until revisions in 1997. In 2006 the EPA
proposed revisions to NAAQS for PM which included maintaining the
annual standard for fine PM at 15 g/m 3 to protect from long-term exposure
and setting the daily standard at 35 g/m 3 to protect from short-term
exposure. CASAC objected to this, but the EPA issued its final rule
without any changes to the proposed fine PM standards. As a result of this,
the petitioners filed the instant suit claiming that the promulgated rule was
arbitrary and capricious.
The petitioners claimed that setting the primary annual NAAQS
for PM 2.5 at 15 g/m 3 was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA only
considered studies on long-term exposure and completely dismissed the
reports on short-term exposure. The EPA stated that the long-term studies
were the "most directly relevant" and that the short-term exposure would
be more suitable to consider when setting the 24-hour standard. The Court
found that this conclusion relied on the EPA establishing that it was
appropriate to consider only the long-term studies to set the annual
standards and that utilizing only daily standards would adequately protect
against short-term exposure. The petitioners pointed out that CASAC
recommended an annual standard below 15 g/m 3. In determining this,
CASAC cited short-term studies that had established a negative health
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impact from short-term exposure in areas where the annual levels of PM2 .5
were less than 15 g/m 3. The EPA's only explanation for not accepting
CASAC's suggestions was that although it did not disagree with
CASAC's statements, it asserted the short-term studies were more
appropriately utilized when setting the 24-hour standards. The Court found
this explanation inadequate to justify only utilizing the long-term exposure
studies in determining appropriate annual standards.
The petitioners also disputed that the daily standards are adequate
to protect against short-term exposure. CASAC found that some cities
with high levels of PM2.5 don't exceed the daily standard of 35 g/m 3 very
often and that a level of less than 15g/m3 would be necessary to prevent
the risks of short-term exposure. The EPA supported that the daily
standard would sufficiently protect against short-term exposure by citing a
study of Philadelphia and Los Angeles showing that the off-peak levels of
PM 2.5 were reduced in proportion to a reduction in the peak levels. The
Court notes that the exact same study states that these reductions were not
a result of PM 2.5 controls, but attributed the reduction to controls
implemented for PM 10, along with other air pollution controls. As a result
of this the Court found that the EPA did not provide a reasonable
explanation for its belief that daily standards would adequately protect
against short-term exposure, and remanded the annual standard for further
review, but did not vacate it.
KEvIN DOTHAGER
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